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What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI 
Principles of Family Dissolution∗ 
David D. Meyer∗∗ 
 
In assessing the interplay of a statutory scheme and the Constitu-
tion, the usual question is whether the drafters of the code have 
taken sufficient account of the constitutional terrain. This is certainly 
a fair question when it comes to the American Law Institute’s 
(“ALI”) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (“Principles”) 
because the Principles include significant innovations in the public 
regulation of intimate relationships, an area in which that terrain of-
ten has proved treacherous.1 The question seems especially salient in 
connection with chapter 2’s custody provisions in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s recent disapproval of Washington’s third-party visi-
tation law in Troxel v. Granville.2 But certain innovations in the ALI 
Principles seem to warrant turning the question around to ask 
whether the judges who craft the evolving constitutional doctrines 
protecting family autonomy have taken sufficient account of the ALI. 
Plainly, one of the central insights of the ALI Principles is their 
appreciation of the enormous complexity and diversity of families 
and the ways in which they order their relationships. This is perhaps 
most obvious in chapter 2’s redefinition of “parent” to include not 
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. I am grateful to the other participants in this symposium who offered many 
helpful and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to Lynn Wardle for invit-
ing me. 
 ∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois.  
1. The Principles, set out in separate chapters addressing custody, child support, prop-
erty division, and support for spouses and domestic partners, do not purport to be a restate-
ment of family law, but rather a statement of recommended principles. See Foreword to 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS, xiii 
(Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997). 
 2. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Although the Court struck down only the application of the 
law in that case, the Justices also expressed more general disapproval of Washington’s “breath-
takingly broad” visitation statute. Id. at 67 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). For a more com-
plete analysis of that case, see David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After 
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (2001). 
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only biological and adoptive parents, but also those who have played 
the caregiving role of a parent.3 Also eye-grabbing is chapter 2’s mat-
ter-of-fact contemplation that a child may have more than two (and 
perhaps even more than three or four4) parents at a time and that 
circumstances might justify granting primary custodial responsibility 
to a nontraditional “parent,” even over the objections of a fit bio-
logical or adoptive parent.5 The drafters’ sensitivity to diversity and 
nuance extends beyond family form and also includes the dynamics 
of family interaction, as well. The Principles’ abandonment of the 
traditional bifurcation of “custody” and “visitation” in favor of the 
unified term “custodial responsibility,” consisting in most cases of 
whatever caregiving or parenting role each adult performed before 
the court’s intervention,6 reflects the drafters’ recognition that the 
roles of individual parents cannot be pigeonholed into a few discrete 
categories, but in fact exist across a vast and fuzzy spectrum.7 
In this aspect, the Principles’ drafters generally have served 
America’s families, and especially its children, well.8 The Principles 
 
 3. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(a)–(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
 4. Id. § 2.21 cmt. b (suggesting scenario in which a child might have four parents—
two legal and two de facto—simultaneously). 
 5. Id. §§ 2.09, 2.21(1)(a)(i)–(ii). 
 6. Id. § 2.09; see generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: 
How the American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Indi-
vidual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 478–82 (1999). 
 7. The drafters explained the change in chapter 1: 
The traditional “custody” and “visitation” terminology symbolize and help to per-
petuate the adversarial, win-lose nature of the process for determining arrangements 
for children after a family breakdown. . . . Once planning for the child at divorce is 
viewed as a more dynamic and complex process, these terms are inadequate. Chapter 
2 uses “custodial responsibility” to encompass all forms of custody and visitation. 
This shift in terminology expresses the ordinary expectation that both parents have 
meaningful responsibilities for their child at divorce; the only question is what those 
responsibilities will be. Likewise, the term “decision-making responsibility” reframes 
the traditional concept of “legal custody” to better connote a division of authority 
to be exercised on behalf of the child, rather than a status won by one parent at the 
expense of the other. The changes in terminology are superficial, but they may help 
to reconstruct the nature of disputes over children from who will possess and con-
trol children to what adjustments in family roles will be most appropriate for the 
child. 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 1, 
at 9 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, Part I)]; see also id. § 2.03 cmt. e. 
 8. Notwithstanding significant differences in emphasis among competing theories of 
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do not seek to “deconstruct” the theoretical “American family” so 
much as to “reconstruct”9 the judicial process so that it will do less 
damage to real, living families who find themselves splintered by in-
ternal discord.10 No family is threatened with destruction by a legal 
regime that seeks to understand how families actually live in the here 
and now and to honor children’s need for stability and continuity at 
a time of upheaval and vulnerability. Rather than steer families to-
ward some preferred model of child rearing, chapter 2’s overriding 
goal is to ensure that parenting practices the parties saw fit to estab-
lish for their children before a family rupture are preserved thereafter 
to the extent possible. In this sense, as Dean Katharine Bartlett has 
rightly observed, the Principles are not “family[]standardizing” but 
“family enabling.”11 
Yet the success of the ALI’s approach depends crucially on the 
readiness of constitutional doctrine to assimilate the ALI’s own in-
sight. Several of the most important innovations in chapter 2 would 
be difficult to square with a constitutional doctrine that conceives of 
family liberties in rigid, all-or-nothing terms. If legal parents, for ex-
ample, really do have a fundamental right to the “care, custody, and 
control” of their children, as the Supreme Court has insisted as re-
cently as last year,12 and if this is really to mean that any meaningful 
state intervention trammeling a parent’s choices must survive strict 
scrutiny, as many have understood the Court’s position, then several 
of the ALI’s directives are in doubt. The ALI Principles fare much 
 
child development, “[n]ear consensus does exist . . . for the principle that a child’s healthy 
growth depends in large part upon the continuity of his personal relationships.” Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when 
the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902 (1984); accord Eliza-
beth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 630–
32 (1992) (“[c]hild development experts emphasize the harmful impact of the disruption asso-
ciated with divorce, and the link between continuity of the parent-child relationship and 
healthy child development.”). 
 9.  PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 7, at  9. 
 10. By its own terms, chapter 2’s provisions on custody and child rearing apply only if 
the parents are separated or if there has been some disruption in the “child’s residence with a 
de facto parent.” See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 7, § 2.01. This is 
important because it substantially limits the opportunities under chapter 2 for uninvited incur-
sions upon what is often characterized as the “intact family.” See infra Part II.A. 
 11. Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family From the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 809, 819 (1998). 
 12. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); 
see also, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t. of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
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better, however, if the Constitution’s regard for family privacy is un-
derstood in more nuanced terms as offering a range of protection 
that depends upon the particular family relationship at stake and the 
quality and depth of the state’s intrusion—in other words, if the 
Constitution’s appreciation for the diversity and complexity of family 
life is as finely tuned as the ALI’s. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION AS QUICKSAND 
Under one view, the constitutional terrain might appear to hold 
quicksand for the sort of innovations proposed by the ALI. The Su-
preme Court, after all, has observed “that a natural parent’s ‘desire 
for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children’ is an interest far more precious than any prop-
erty right.”13 In an otherwise deeply splintered decision last spring, 
one of the few propositions upon which the Justices could readily 
agree in Troxel was that the constitutional right of parents “to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” 
is “fundamental.”14 Under well-worn due process and equal protec-
tion doctrine, that ranking implies “the most rigid scrutiny”15 of un-
wanted state incursions and a narrow field for legislative experimen-
tation.16 
Two recurring themes of the family privacy doctrine, in particu-
lar, would seem to pose real danger for the sort of innovation cham-
pioned by the ALI Principles. The first is the dominant traditional-
ism of the doctrine and the second is its oft-purported absolutism. 
 
 13. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). 
 14. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); accord id. at 76–77 
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
id. at 95–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Only Justice Scalia had doubts about the fundamental-
ity of parents’ child-rearing rights under the Constitution. See id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that court-ordered visitation implicates no fundamental right of parents). 
 15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 16. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 10.2, at 644 (1997) (stating that “certain aspects of family autonomy [including 
parental child-rearing] are fundamental rights and that governmental interference will be al-
lowed only if strict scrutiny is met”); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS § 2.5, at 72–85 (1998) (assuming strict scrutiny 
applies); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.28, at 866 
(6th ed. 2000) (anticipating that Court would apply strict scrutiny in Troxel). 
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A. Traditionalism 
The traditionalism is surely most apparent in the way in which 
courts define the “family” entitled to constitutional protection. The 
Supreme Court often has sought validation for its enforcement of 
substantive due process in deeply rooted societal consensus about the 
outer limits of governmental power. In the specific context of family 
privacy rights, this has meant rooting the protection of emotional re-
lationships in traditional conceptions of what counts as “family.” The 
bond between a grandson and his grandmother, for example, was 
said to warrant special constitutional protection against state en-
croachment in Moore v. City of East Cleveland17 because society had 
long venerated the choice of extended lineal families to live together, 
at least “in this degree of kinship.”18 By contrast, society’s traditional 
disinclination to regard unrelated cohabitants as “family” permitted a 
city to ban such households without triggering any heightened con-
stitutional protection.19 Embedded societal norms permit a man and 
a woman to claim “family” status in their decision to marry but pre-
clude other combinations.20 No matter how strong the emotional 
bonds between unmarried cohabitants (or between other unconven-
tional intimates, such as a biological father and the daughter he con-
ceived during an extramarital affair21), such individuals simply fall 
outside the traditional idea of “family”; therefore, no special justifica-
tion is required by the Constitution for measures intruding upon 
their relations. 
Moreover, even when the constitutional claimants unquestiona-
bly qualify as “family” under traditional norms, the Court has looked 
to traditional consensus in evaluating the permissibility of particular 
regulatory schemes. The Court has been especially wary of legislative 
initiatives that seem novel or experimental. For example, in striking 
 
 17. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 18. Id. at 505–06 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). 
 19. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3, 8–9 (1974). 
 20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398–99 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Dean v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 332–33 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55–56 (Haw. 
1993) (interpreting parallel privacy guarantee of state constitution); Lynn D. Wardle, A Criti-
cal Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 32–33; but 
see Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743, at *4–5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 
1998) (interpreting parallel privacy guarantee of state constitution). 
 21. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 & n.3 (1989). 
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down a state’s efforts to restrict remarriage by delinquent child-
support obligors in Zablocki v. Redhail,22 several Justices made clear 
that the “unprecedented” nature of the experiment heightened the 
state’s constitutional burden.23 “The Due Process Clause requires a 
[greater] showing of justification,” Justice Powell explained, “‘when 
the government intrudes on choices concerning family living ar-
rangements’ in a manner which is contrary to deeply rooted tradi-
tions.”24 
Of course, the Court has not always hewed so closely to tradition 
in marking the constitutional boundaries of family. In its more gen-
erous moments, the Court has upheld the fundamental right to 
marry among some couples whose relationships plainly could not 
claim deep historical veneration, including interracial couples in the 
1960s25 and inmate couples in the 1980s.26 More to the point for 
chapter 2 of the ALI Principles, the Court left the door open in 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform27 
to the possibility that a substantial emotional relationship between a 
child and a nontraditional caregiver might warrant constitutional 
protection under principles of family privacy.28 Yet, in doing so, the 
 
 22. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 23. Id. at 402–03 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 
id. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“A legislative judgment so alien to our traditions . . . of-
fends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 24. Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (finding a fundamental right for in-
terracial couples to marry). 
 26. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (finding a fundamental right for inmates to 
marry while incarcerated); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part) (acknowledging that the “mode of historical analysis . . . may be somewhat inconsistent 
with our past decisions in this area,” including Loving and Turner); id. at 137–40 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 27. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 28. Although in some cases the Court has conceived of family status in categorical 
terms—compare, for example, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), with 
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)—in which the line of constitutional protec-
tion for family kinship was drawn at individuals related by “blood, adoption, or marriage”—in 
other cases, the Court has meandered toward a somewhat more functional understanding of 
family. In its cases dealing with unwed fathers, for example, the Court has made constitutional 
status as a parent depend not upon paternity alone, but also upon whether he has “act[ed] as a 
father” toward his child. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–62 (1983). The Court also 
acknowledged in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844–
45 (1977), that “a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child 
in his or her care [—and one that might warrant constitutional protection—] may exist even in 
the absence of blood relationship.”. 
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Court left no doubt that the claim of any such unconventional “fam-
ily-like association”29 must give way in conflict with that of the tradi-
tional, “natural family.”30 Although the Court allowed that it could 
not “dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated indi-
viduals,”31 the foster family nevertheless lacked the historical venera-
tion deemed crucial in Moore; any constitutional interests the foster 
family might claim would be “substantially attenuated” compared to 
those of a “natural family.” The recognition of such a constitutional 
hierarchy, grounded directly in historical notions of a “natural” fam-
ily, poses obvious difficulty for a project that would redefine basic 
family roles and reassign traditional prerogatives.32 
B. Absolutism 
A second current in family privacy jurisprudence, also trouble-
some for the ALI Principles, is a tendency to conceive of the relevant 
constitutional restraints in absolute terms. The Supreme Court has 
encouraged this tendency by regularly employing grandiose rhetoric 
in describing the Constitution’s regard for family liberties, asserting, 
for example, that the document carves out “a ‘private realm of family 
life which the state cannot enter.’”33 It is, of course, quite impossible 
to reconcile this rhetoric with a succession of cases upholding a wide 
 
 29. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. 
 30. Id. at 846–47. Recently, one federal court extended this holding to deny constitu-
tional protection to a foster family even in the absence of any conflicting claim by the child’s 
“natural family.” See Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The court 
held that a foster parent could claim no constitutional interest in “family integrity,” even after 
the foster child had been freed for adoption. While acknowledging that the foster parent and 
child had established a “deeply loving and interdependent relationship” during their years to-
gether, one that was “as [emotionally] close” as between any parent and child, the court con-
cluded that the unconventional origins of the relationship in a putatively temporary foster care 
arrangement meant they had “no right to exclude the State from their family lives.” Id. at 
1379–80. 
 31. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844–45. 
 32. Indeed, a constitutional preference for the “natural” family would seem to imply 
that even adoptive parents would be at some disadvantage in a child rearing or custody dispute 
with a biological parent. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Rhetoric, the Unnatural Family, and Women’s 
Work, 81 VA. L. REV. 2275, 2277 (1995) (“To the extent that the word ‘natural’ is used with 
respect to familial relations, it is to describe a biological relationship as distinct from a social or 
legal relationship, as in ‘natural parents’ as opposed to ‘adoptive parents.’”). If so, plainly a 
new class of “parents” who possess neither a biological nor an adoptive tie with a child would 
occupy a still more precarious position in the constitutional hierarchy. 
 33. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
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swath of public intrusions upon marriage, procreation, child rearing, 
and related liberties.34 Yet, for the most part, the Court itself has 
managed to combine its penchant for exaggerated privacy rhetoric 
with a pragmatic realism in deciding actual cases.35 Lower court 
judges, however, especially state court judges who most often en-
counter challenges to family law measures, have been less successful 
in marrying platitude and pragmatism. 
Taking the Court at its word about the inviolable sanctity of the 
family, state and lower federal courts have often analyzed family pri-
vacy claims in rigid, categorical terms. Under this approach, virtually 
any substantial incursion on a parent’s child rearing authority must 
be tested by the same grueling constitutional standard.36 Given the 
ranking of parental child rearing as a fundamental right, these courts 
reason that any but the most incidental burdens can be sustained 
only if the government proves that the action is necessary to serve a 
compelling public interest.37 What qualifies as “compelling,” more-
over, is usually fixed without regard to the magnitude of the state’s 
intrusion. Indeed, it is common for state courts to look to cases in-
volving the termination of parental rights or a permanent loss of cus-
 
 34. For a fuller examination of the disjunction between the rhetoric and reality of fam-
ily-privacy doctrine, see David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
527, 531–54 (2000). 
 35. See id. Thus, in the very case in which the Court first insisted that there existed a 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” the Court went on to uphold state 
intervention that overruled a guardian’s decision to enlist the aid of her niece in religious leaf-
letting. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 36. I certainly do not mean to suggest that lower courts uniformly follow this approach. 
To the contrary, the courts follow widely divergent approaches in family-privacy cases. Com-
pare, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997) (subjecting juve-
nile curfew law, which intruded on parents’ child rearing prerogatives, to strict scrutiny), with 
Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny in challenge to curfew law) and Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of 
Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that rational-basis scrutiny is appropri-
ate), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997). My claim is only that the rigid, categorical approach 
is a common and recurring one. 
 37. See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946 (applying strict scrutiny to juvenile curfew law 
that limited parents’ ability to authorize late-night travels by their children); Alfonso v. Fer-
nandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to state pro-
gram to distribute condoms at public high schools), leave to appeal dismissed, 637 N.E.2d 279 
(N.Y. 1994); Richard Garner, Fundamentally Speaking: Application of Ohio’s Domestic Vio-
lence Laws in Parental Discipline Cases—A Parental Perspective, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1998) (concluding that all “[s]tate laws purporting to regulate parental discipline, directly or 
by implication,” impinge upon parents’ fundamental child-rearing rights and must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny). 
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tody in describing the showing necessary to justify a far lesser inter-
vention, such as an order of unwanted visitation.38 
In the Troxel case, for example, the Washington state supreme 
court held that because parents have a fundamental right to rear their 
children, including the authority to decide with whom their child 
will associate, any order for grandparent visitation over a parent’s ob-
jection must survive strict scrutiny.39 The only child welfare interest 
sufficiently strong to rank as “compelling,” the court ruled, would 
be an interest in protecting a child from the infliction of serious 
harm.40 By this view, however, the Constitution demands the same 
public justification for a relatively modest intrusion on parental pre-
rogative, such as infrequent, brief visits with an extended family 
member,41 as it does for a much more drastic intervention, such as 
depriving a parent of custody.42 
The courts’ absolutist bent can also exert pressure in the opposite 
direction, leading courts to minimize some constitutional safeguards 
 
 38. See, e.g., In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the Con-
stitution requires proof that “a parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her 
child” to justify terminating parental rights); In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. 1999) (re-
quiring same showing to justify granting custody to a nonparent); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 
573, 577 (Tenn. 1993) (requiring same showing to justify granting visitation to grandparents 
over parental objection). 
 39. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28 (Wash. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); accord Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285, 290 
(N.D. 1999); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772–73 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 942 (1995). Recently, in a case decided after the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel, the 
Maine Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 
300–01 (Me. 2000). 
 40. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d at 28–30. 
 41. The specific facts of the Troxel case involved quite substantial visitation with the 
grandparents, including one weekend every month, one week during the summer, and four 
hours on each of the grandparents’ birthdays. Id. at 23. The court, however, did not suggest—
and, indeed, implicitly rejected the notion—that lesser amounts of visitation could be justified 
by a lesser showing. Id. at 28–30 (stating broadly and without qualification that courts may 
order third-party visitation only upon proof of harm to child); cf. id. at 33–35 (Talmadge, J., 
dissenting in part) (arguing unsuccessfully for an approach that would correlate the strength of 
the requisite public interest with the specific amount of visitation allowed). 
 42. See id. at 33–35 (Talmadge, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d 
388, 391–92 (Mont. 1996) (holding that parent may not constitutionally be denied custody 
absent proof of “abuse, neglect, or dependency”); In re M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813, 819 (Kan. 
1995) (holding that parent may not constitutionally be denied custody absent proof of unfit-
ness or serious harm to child). Indeed, the Constitution permits the complete and irrevocable 
termination of parental rights based upon clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness, 
including the infliction of serious harm to a child by means of neglect or abuse. See Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
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while they exaggerate others. When courts are reluctant to bring 
down the boom of strict scrutiny on particular governmental regula-
tion, for example, the only recourse under an absolutist conception 
of family privacy is to hold that the regulated activity or relationship 
falls outside the scope of the fundamental right.43 Thus, in some re-
cent cases courts have held that no special constitutional scrutiny is 
required of laws forcing parents to conform their educational plans 
to state standards,44 to produce a child for visitation by extended 
relatives,45 or even to appear regularly in court to defend against re-
peated petitions to terminate parental rights,46 all on the rather im-
plausible ground that these burdens were so minimal that they sim-
ply did not register on the constitutional radar. In this way, the all-
or-nothing character of conventional fundamental rights analysis can 
lead to distortions at both ends of the spectrum. 
In summary, the doctrinal currents of traditionalism and absolut-
ism combine to spell trouble for certain of the ALI’s more innovative 
custody provisions. Traditionalism leads the courts to recognize as 
holders of constitutional privacy rights only those persons whose 
claims to family status have long-standing societal approval.47 Non-
traditional family members, or even extended members of a tradi-
tional family,48 may then be unable to invoke any privacy interests of 
their own with which to offset the competing claims of a traditional 
 
 43. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 561–65. 
 44. See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993). 
 45. See Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding, even after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), that because forced 
visitation with a grandparent is a sufficiently minimal intrusion on parental rights, it does not 
trigger strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 351 (2001); In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 
365–66 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (same). 
 46. See Phelps v. Sybinsky, 736 N.E.2d 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that law 
requiring mentally ill parents with children in state custody to appear in court every eighteen 
months to defend against action to terminate parental rights does not infringe sufficiently on 
parents’ fundamental right to trigger strict scrutiny). 
 47. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–23, 123 n.3 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., plurality opinion) (holding that man who fathered daughter in adulterous relationship with 
married woman could not claim fundamental privacy interest in relationship because society 
did not “respect” their parent-child relationship). 
 48. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–06 (1993) (concluding that alien children in 
the custody of immigration authorities had no fundamental right to be released to the custody 
of an extended relative omitted from a statutory list); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (finding constitutional protection for blood relatives “in this degree 
of kinship”) (emphasis added). 
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family member.49 At the same time, the absolutist impulse pushes the 
courts to demand exceptional justifications—such as proof of paren-
tal “unfitness” or the need to avoid “substantial harm” to a child—
even for relatively minor interventions on behalf of a nontraditional 
family member. 
C. Estoppel and De Facto Parents 
The forces of traditionalism and absolutism might be expected to 
whipsaw the provisions in sections 2.03, 2.09, and 2.21 of the Prin-
ciples because they confer parental status on certain caregivers not-
withstanding their lack of any biological or adoptive relationship to a 
child. Those provisions treat an unrelated adult who has lived with 
and provided substantial care for a child as a “parent” who is pre-
sumptively entitled to at least some share of future custodial respon-
sibility.50 If the adult has acted as a parent to the child as a result of a 
good-faith, but mistaken, belief in his paternity or as a result of a co-
parenting agreement predating the child’s birth, then the adult is 
considered a “parent by estoppel” with a claim to custody that is 
precisely equal to that of a legal (i.e., biological or adoptive) parent.51 
If the adult assumes a parenting role at some later date with the con-
sent of the legal parent (as is customarily true of stepparents, for ex-
ample), and performs that role while living with the child for at least 
 
 49. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301 n.16 (Me. 2000) (rejecting con-
tention that grandparents who helped to rear grandchildren might have countervailing consti-
tutional interests of their own in continued contact with their grandchildren); In re Thomp-
son, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. App. 1999) (concluding that former live-in, same-sex 
partners who had helped to rear children could assert no constitutional privacy interest in 
maintaining relationship with children following breakup with children’s biological mother; 
“we are unaware of . . . any prior controlling precedent that has utilized the concept of either 
de facto parenthood and/or in loco parentis to extend constitutional parental rights . . . .”). 
But see In re Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that a child had a fundamental constitutional liberty interest in remaining in the cus-
tody of nonparent caregivers). 
 50. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 2.03. 
 51. Id. §§ 2.03(1)(b), 2.21(1). This would represent a substantial change of law for 
many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999) (finding that man 
who had lived with and helped raise children in mistaken belief that he was their biological fa-
ther had no legal basis for seeking custody or visitation after separation from children’s 
mother); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1997) (concluding that man in same situa-
tion could seek custody only by proving that biological parent had acted in a manner contrary 
to responsible parental role); see also PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 
2.03 Reporter’s Notes cmt. b (acknowledging that, under current law, “[m]any cases decline 
to apply any equitable theory, even under very compelling circumstances”). 
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two years, the adult is classified as a “de facto parent.”52 A de facto 
parent is also presumptively entitled to some share of custodial time, 
although not to a “majority” of custodial responsibility.53 
The difficulty this scheme will face under conventional constitu-
tional analysis is that all these adults traditionally have been consid-
ered legal “strangers” to the child, barred from any child rearing role 
over a parent’s objection except upon some quite extraordinary 
showing, such as the parent’s unfitness. Consider, for instance, the 
following scenarios contemplated by the ALI Principles: (1) a stepfa-
ther who, having formed a close and loving relationship with his 
stepson, seeks custody following the death of the child’s mother; (2) 
grandparents, or a close friend, who have served as a young girl’s 
primary caregivers for years and now resist the mother’s attempt to 
reclaim custody after having pulled her life together; and (3) a man 
who helps to rear two children in the mistaken belief that he is their 
father and who resists the mother’s demand for exclusive custody af-
ter a falling out. All these caregivers would be considered “parents” 
under the ALI Principles. The stepfather and grandparents would be 
classified as “de facto parents,”54 and the man in the third scenario a 
“parent by estoppel.”55 As such, the courts would be directed to give 
them a continuing role in rearing the child, one substantially similar 
to the role they played before the falling out with the legal parent 
brought them into court.56 The parent by estoppel and the biological 
mother would be treated identically in any custody contest. Though 
de facto parents are at some disadvantage to other parents in seeking 
custody, if the legal parent were found not to have been “performing 
a reasonable share of parenting functions,” the court would be per-
mitted to allocate even primary custodial responsibility to the de 
facto parent without any need to demonstrate that “the alternative 
would cause harm to the child.”57 
Yet, it is a measure of the challenge confronting the ALI that 
 
 52. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 2.03(1)(c). 
 53. Id. § 2.21(1)(a). 
 54. Each would qualify as a “de facto parent” so long as he or she had resided with the 
child for at least two years and had performed a leading or co-equal caretaking role for nonpe-
cuniary reasons with the agreement of the legal parent. See id. § 2.03(1)(c). 
 55. See id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii). 
 56. See id. §§ 2.09, 2.10 (directing courts, within certain limits, to seek to allocate cus-
todial responsibilities in a manner that would replicate the allocation that existed before the 
dispute). 
 57. Id. § 2.21(1)(a). 
MEY-PP1 1/3/02  2:19 PM 
1075] What Constitutional Law Can Learn 
 1087 
state supreme courts have decided these very cases for “natural” par-
ents on constitutional grounds.58 Lacking traditional recognition as 
parents, long-time caregivers lacking biological or adoptive ties are 
classified as nonparents, or legal “strangers,” for constitutional pur-
poses.59 It is then said to follow that the state may intrude on paren-
tal authority to foster their continued involvement in a child’s life 
only on proof of a “compelling interest,” such as the need to spare 
the child from substantial harm or the clutches of an unfit parent.60 
This standard obviously leaves little room for custody orders favoring 
a caregiver who is not a legal parent.61 As one judge recently ob-
served, “[i]t is a rare case in which a de facto parent can credibly ar-
gue that custody with either natural parent would really jeopardize 
 
 58. See, e.g., In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1999) (transferring custody to mother 
from family friend who had raised child for approximately eight years); Price v. Howard, 484 
S.E.2d 528, 536–37 (N.C. 1997) (holding that man who had been child’s primary caregiver in 
mutually mistaken belief that he was the child’s biological father could retain custody against 
mother’s claim only if she was unfit or acted in a manner inconsistent with presumed parental 
love); In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d 388 (Mont. 1996) (denying custody to stepfather); In re 
Guardianship of Williams, 869 P.2d 661 (Kan. 1994) (transferring custody from long-time 
friend/guardian to mother); Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. 1994) (transferring 
custody from prospective adoptive parents, with whom child had been living after adoption 
had failed, to biological parents); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981) (transfer-
ring custody from grandparents to mother). 
 59. See, e.g., Petersen, 445 S.E.2d at 906 (concluding that parents’ fundamental right 
precludes custody claims by “strangers,” including prospective adoptive parents who had been 
rearing child for extended period after adoption failed). 
 60. See Holland v. Holland, No. E1999-00586-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 337545, at *6 
(Tenn. App. Mar. 31, 2000) (“Only if the Court first concludes that neither parent is fit and 
that awarding custody to either parent would put [the child] at risk of substantial danger of 
harm should the Court consider any other alternative custodian.”); In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d at 
392 (holding that the court may not “deprive a natural parent of his or her constitutionally 
protected rights [including awarding custody to a long-time, custodial stepparent] absent a 
finding of abuse and neglect or dependency”); Sheppard, 630 P.2d at 1127 (“[A] natural par-
ent’s right to custody of his or her children is a fundamental right which may not be disturbed 
by this State or by third persons [including grandparents who are a child’s long-time, caregiv-
ing custodians], absent a showing that the natural parent is unfit.”); see also Richardson v. 
Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Fla. 2000) (striking down statute permitting grandpar-
ents to compete for custody with parents under a “best interests of the child” standard); In re 
Askew, 993 S.W.2d at 4 (holding that parent may not constitutionally be denied custody in 
favor of a nonparent without proof of unfitness or substantial harm to child). 
 61. For a fuller discussion of the legal obstacles traditionally faced by a nonparent care-
giver seeking to regain or retain custody against the wishes of a legal parent, see Bartlett, supra 
note 8, at 911–45; David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the 
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 793–98 (1999); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatch-
ing the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 
(1993). 
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the child.”62 To prove the point, consider that in recent months 
courts have ruled against nonparent caregivers on the basis that there 
were no constitutionally sufficient grounds to deny custody to a 
mother freshly acquitted of arranging the murder of the children’s 
father and, in another case, to a mother who insisted upon leaving 
her young son each day in the care of a relative who had been previ-
ously convicted of sexually molesting a young boy.63 Indeed, courts 
often are reluctant to find “harm” sufficient to override a parent’s 
wishes, even when a child faces the prospect of losing all contact with 
a long-time nonparent caregiver.64 Plainly, under this view, the ALI’s 
directive—that “parents by estoppel” and “de facto parents” must 
share child rearing duties with legal parents without any showing 
that the legal parents are unfit or that the division of child rearing 
authority is necessary to avert substantial harm to the child—would 
be untenable. 
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE: SEEING FAMILIES  
IN SHADES OF GRAY 
The main reason why the ALI’s treatment of what current law 
calls nonparent caregivers scrapes up so hard against the conven-
 
 62. John C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, 14 ME. B.J. 18, 28 (1999). 
 63. See Speagle v. Seitz, 541 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 2000); Adams v. Tessener, 539 S.E.2d 
324 (N.C. 2000). 
 64. In a recent Virginia case, for example, a court held that a father who gained custody 
of his son after being released from prison was constitutionally entitled to cut off contact with 
the foster parents who had raised the child since he was two months old. See In re Richardson, 
No. HK 1364-A, 2000 WL 869450 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2000). Notwithstanding expert 
testimony that “separation from the [foster parents] is the psychological equivalent to the 
death of a parent, placing [the child] in significant risk for depression, lowered self-esteem, and 
guilt in later years,” id. at *2, the court concluded that the boy would not “suffer actual harm” 
sufficient to justify second-guessing the father’s wishes, id. at *4; see also, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 
725 A.2d 13, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (Braithwhite, J., concurring in part & dis-
senting in part) (concluding that “the potential for serious psychological harm [would be], at 
best, a speculative possibility” if a girl were denied future contact with the woman who had 
helped to raise her since birth as her “other mother”), aff’d, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert. 
denied, 69 USLW 3096 (U.S. 2000); In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ill. 1994) 
(Heiple, J., concurring) (doubting that the four-year-old boy, known as “Baby Richard,” 
would suffer long-term psychological harm from being abruptly transferred from the home of 
the couple who had raised him since birth to the custody of the biological father he had never 
met). As Barbara Woodhouse has shown, these cases are consistent with a long line of cases 
which, “[a]lthough giving lip service to children’s interests, . . . fail to reflect children’s experi-
ence of reality.” Woodhouse, supra note 61, at 1809–10. 
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tional understanding of family privacy is that the ALI discerns shades 
of gray within the family that are often obscured by a fixation on tra-
dition and categorization. Conventional analysis, or at least the pre-
dominant strain of it found in the state courts, favors bright lines. 
Courts feel compelled to classify a caregiver either as a parent or as a 
“stranger”; all child rearing authority is then assigned to parents, to 
the exclusion of all others.65 Only if the parent’s shortcomings are so 
total as to constitute “unfitness”—thereby providing grounds for 
stripping parental rights and transforming the “parent” into just an-
other “stranger”66—may a court carve out a child rearing role for a 
nonparent. 
The ALI, too, differentiates between “parents” and “nonpar-
ents,” but its conception of parenthood is broader and the exclu-
sionary heft attached to the concept is less total. Under the ALI 
Principles, parents may come to their status not only by way of a 
clear marker, such as childbirth or a court decree, but also gradually 
through the slow adjustment of caretaking roles within a functioning 
family. Parenthood, moreover, is not a unitary status encompassing a 
single package of duties and entitlements. Instead, chapter 2 of the 
Principles comprehends gradations of “parents” (legal, de facto, and 
by estoppel), each supported by a distinctive child rearing role and 
each conferring its own distinctive set of legal entitlements. Rather 
than searching for a prevailing rights-holder among these caregiv-
ers—some winner who shall then be crowned “custodian”—the ALI 
Principles favor an accommodation that would provide for the ongo-
ing involvement of them all.67 The ALI’s approach, in short, blurs 
the lines that conventional constitutional doctrine strives to make 
bright. Instead of condemning the ALI Principles for deviating from 
the traditional constitutional schemata of “parents” and “nonpar-
 
 65. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 8, at 879–91, 918–19. 
 66. See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T98314013, 758 A.2d 552, 558 (Md. 
2000) (“‘[A]doption decrees cut the child off from the natural parent, who is made a legal 
stranger to his offspring.’”) (quoting Walker v. Gardner, 157 A.2d 273 (Md. 1960)); A.J. v. 
L.O., 697 A.2d 1189, 1191–92 (D.C. 1997) (“[T]he termination of plaintiffs’ parental 
rights . . . changed plaintiffs into legal strangers . . . to their biological children.”); Weaver v. 
Roanoke Dep’t of Human Res., 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Va. 1980) (“[T]ermination of the legal 
relationship between parent and child . . . renders the parent ‘a legal stranger to the child.’”). 
 67. The “approximation standard” of section 2.09, under which a court’s allocation of 
custodial responsibility is to be based chiefly upon the division of child-rearing roles established 
by the parties before the court’s intervention, was first proposed by Professor Elizabeth Scott. 
See Scott, supra note 8, at 637–43. 
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ents,” “fitness” and “harm,” it is worth pausing to consider whether 
the conventional understanding of family privacy could benefit from 
the ALI’s more nuanced vision of child rearing roles. Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that the conventional account overstates the 
strength and rigidity of the rights assigned to traditional parents and 
that the obsessive focus on bright-line categorization that character-
izes so many recent state court decisions is not mandated by the Su-
preme Court’s cases. Rather, if more judges acquired the ALI’s sense 
of possibility about the family and its sense of proportionality in 
evaluating governmental responses, they might find a way to protect 
the core constitutional values of family integrity and intimacy with-
out doing violence to families that fall outside the boundaries of 
convention. Even before the Supreme Court’s latest foray into family 
privacy in Troxel, there was an obvious disjuncture between the 
Court’s sprawling rhetoric about family autonomy and its pragmatic 
toleration of wide-ranging intrusions on the family.68 Language in-
sisting that the family resides in a “private realm” beyond the reach 
of the state decorates opinions that, as in Prince v. Massachusetts,69 
conclude by upholding coercive measures to enforce conformity with 
public norms concerning the conduct of family life.70 Close reading 
of the Court’s cases involving marriage, parenting, and kinship sug-
gests that, notwithstanding the broad language exalting the “funda-
mental” nature of family privacy rights, the Court in truth has ap-
plied something less than strict scrutiny in their defense.71 Far from 
the absolutist’s assumption of strict scrutiny for every incursion, the 
Court’s cases reveal a willingness, at least implicitly, to tailor the na-
ture and strength of judicial scrutiny to the facts of each family pri-
vacy controversy.72 In some cases, the Court has seemed sharply in-
 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
 69. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 70. Having asserted in Prince, for example, that the Constitution recognizes a “private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” id., the Court went on to hold that a guard-
ian could be prosecuted for enlisting the aid of her niece in proselytizing on a public street 
corner. Id. at 168–69. 
 71. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 
1231 (1999) (discussing right to marry); Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the 
Right to Marry: A Dissenting View, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 951–54 (1992) (same); 
Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 
22 GA. L. REV. 975, 988–89 (1988) (discussing rights of child rearing); Meyer, supra note 34, 
at 536–48 (discussing full range of family privacy cases); Meyer, supra note 61, at 838–43 (dis-
cussing right of child rearing). 
 72. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 580–91. 
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tolerant of state meddling,73 while in others, impatiently dismissive of 
a parent’s prerogative.74 Across this range of cases, the Court has ap-
peared to adjust the rigor of its review, and, thus, the strength of the 
public justification required to sustain the state action.75 Among the 
relevant determinants are the depth of the state’s intrusion on the 
family, the extent to which the family is unified in resisting the inter-
vention, and the degree to which the burdened family choice or rela-
tionship enjoys historical veneration.76 A closer look at these factors 
suggests that the ALI Principles are, in fact, rather nicely dovetailed 
with the constitutional constraints. 
A. Presence of Internal Discord Within the Family 
First, the Court has been especially wary of state intervention 
when the family appears to be intact and united in opposition to the 
state’s meddling and less so when the affected family members have 
already been fractured by some internal discord. For example, the 
Court considered it constitutionally relevant in Santosky v. Kramer77 
and Wisconsin v. Yoder78 that the children who were the subjects of 
the state’s protective intervention appeared to join their parents in 
opposing the effort.79 By the same token, the Court has pointed to 
divisions within the family as a reason to qualify the Court’s constitu-
tional scrutiny. In the context of abortion, for example, the Court 
recognized from the beginning that “[t]he pregnant woman cannot 
be isolated in her privacy” because her interest in controlling the fu-
ture of her pregnancy might conflict with that of her husband or 
 
 73. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of Amish par-
ents not to comply with state compulsory schooling law). 
 74. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (rejecting claim that par-
ents have a constitutional right to send their children to a racially exclusionary private school); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (rejecting claim that guardian had a constitu-
tional right to enlist child’s aid in street corner proselytizing). 
 75. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 580–91. 
 76. See id.; David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Fam-
ily, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 583 (2001) (considering how these factors might apply to the question 
of nonparent visitation). 
 77. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 78. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 79. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760–61; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230–31; id. at 237 (Stewart, 
J., concurring); id. at 238 (White, J., concurring). For a critique of the Court’s assessment in 
Yoder, see Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 66–70 
(1999). 
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even the “potentiality of human life” within her.80 So, even before 
the Court expressly qualified its scrutiny in the form of the “undue 
burden” test,81 the Court’s sensitivity to the potential for intrafamily 
conflict over the abortion decision quite apparently led it to loosen 
the rigor of its review.82 
The presence of internal family conflict is relevant to the judicial 
role for at least two reasons. First, the degree to which all family 
members have coalesced around a given choice seems plainly relevant 
to assessing the intrusive quality of the state’s interference. The 
state’s intrusion upon privacy is surely greater when all those affected 
are opposed to the intervention than when the family is internally di-
vided and some have invited the state to break the impasse.83 Second, 
internal family conflict may call into question an important assump-
tion supporting the constitutional bias against state intervention in 
family life. The constitutional deference to parental prerogative, for 
instance, is often justified by the reasonable belief that parents ordi-
narily are better situated and more motivated than judges or bureau-
crats to identify and promote the interests of their children.84 When 
the family is fractured, however, there may be greater reason to sus-
pect that self-interest will overtake or compromise a parent’s usual 
impulses on behalf of children; correspondingly, there may be 
somewhat less reason to defer to parental judgment.85 
This appears to cut in favor of reduced scrutiny of the ALI cus-
tody principles. The provisions for allocating custodial responsibility 
to “parents by estoppel” or “de facto parents,” and, in fact, all provi-
sions of chapter 2, come into play only when there has been some 
 
 80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–59 (1973). 
 81. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 82. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experi-
ence with the 1980’s “Reasonableness” Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 523 (1990) (contending, 
before Casey’s adoption of the “undue burden” test, that the Court in fact applied a flexible 
standard of “reasonableness” in reviewing abortion regulations); Meyer, supra note 2, at 1172–
74 & nn.239–55. 
 83. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 582–83. 
 84. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601–02 (1979) (“[N]atural bonds of affec-
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. 
Buckley, Parental Rights and the Ugly Duckling, 1 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 41, 54–55 (1999); 
Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 
940, 951–60 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2401, 2431–37, 2443–44 (1995). 
 85. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 137–38 (2000); Scott & Scott, supra note 84, at 2446–47. 
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division or upheaval within the family.86 This limitation reflects a 
conscious desire by the drafters to avoid incursions upon intact, uni-
fied families.87 This might be thought, of course, to beg the question 
whether the relevant “family” whose unity counts is defined to in-
clude the adult caregiver with whom a legal parent is feuding. If the 
nontraditional parental caregiver can be excluded for these purposes, 
then the remaining family may appear relatively unified in opposition 
to state intervention.88 Here too, however, the ALI drafters have 
made a strong case for finding family fracture by conferring parental 
status only upon individuals who were brought within the family 
fold, as understood by the participants themselves, by the actions of 
a legal parent. Status as a “parent by estoppel,” for instance, depends 
upon the existence of “a prior co-parenting agreement with the 
child’s legal parent”89 or on other actions or representations by a le-
gal parent that led the “parent by estoppel” to assume the parental 
role.90 Similarly, status as a “de facto parent” requires the formation 
of a parent-child bond either “with the agreement of a legal parent” 
or “as a result of a complete failure or inability of [a] legal parent to 
perform caretaking functions.”91 If a legal parent has actively engen-
dered a sense of family that includes a “de facto parent” or “parent 
by estoppel,” it makes sense to regard the family as divided when the 
two later come to an impasse over custody.92 
 
 86. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 7, § 2.01 (stating that 
custody principles apply only when parents are separated or “when the circumstances underly-
ing a child’s residence with a de facto parent substantially change”). 
 87. See id. § 2.01 cmt. b (noting that “[t]he Chapter does not cover disputes between 
parents arising in the context of an intact, two-parent family. It also does not cover challenges 
by third parties to the authority of legal parents living together, or to the authority of a parent 
who is the child’s only parent. Ordinarily, state intrusion into the intact one- or two-parent 
family is justified only under the state’s abuse and neglect laws.”). 
 88. Of course, even if the independent interests of the nonparent caregiver were entirely 
disregarded, there would remain a potential conflict of interest between the parent who seeks 
to exclude the nonparent and the child whose relationship with the caregiver is jeopardized. 
 89. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii). 
 90. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)(A) (requiring “marriage to the mother or . . . actions or repre-
sentations of the mother” instilling in the man “a reasonable good-faith belief that he was the 
child’s biological father”); id., § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) (requiring “an agreement with the child’s par-
ent” to assume “full and permanent responsibilities as a parent”). 
 91. Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). 
 92. See Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000); cf. Price v. Howard, 484 
S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1997) (emphasizing that, by leading man to believe that he was the 
father of her child, biological mother “chose to rear the child in a family unit with plaintiff be-
ing the child’s de facto father”). 
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B. Extent of State Intrusion 
A second consideration affecting the rigor of constitutional re-
view in past cases is the extent of the state’s intrusion into the family. 
For example, the Court has justified heightened constitutional safe-
guards in actions to terminate parental rights specifically because of 
the “severity” of the state’s intrusion.93 Less drastic forms of state in-
tervention, by contrast, have encountered less restrictive review.94 On 
this score, the ALI’s rejection of the “winner-take-all” mentality of 
traditional custody law and substitution of a new understanding in 
which caretaking and decision-making responsibility can be allocated 
and shared along a broad and complex continuum weighs strongly in 
favor of the chapter 2 provisions. 
Part of the constitutional hostility to nonparent custody found in 
past cases is attributable to the assumptions that surround an award 
of custody under traditional law—namely, that it will elevate the cus-
todian to a role of overwhelming dominance in the child’s upbring-
ing and relegate the noncustodial parent, for all practical purposes, 
to a distant sideline.95 The ALI Principles emphatically reject that as-
 
 93. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765–66 (1982); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 
U.S. 102, 118 (1996) (emphasizing the “unique kind of deprivation” involved in an action to 
terminate parental rights and recognizing that “[t]he object of the proceeding is ‘not simply to 
infringe upon [a parent’s] interest,’ . . . ‘but to end it’”); Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 27 (1981) . 
 94. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), for example, Justice Stewart sug-
gested that a law prohibiting a parent from sending her child to a private school would trigger 
more substantial review than a law merely restricting the educational program at the parent’s 
chosen school. Id. at 178. The Court also has differentiated its review of various regulations 
restricting entry into marriage based upon “[t]he directness and substantiality of the [particu-
lar] interference with the freedom to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 
(1978). 
 95. Traditionally,  
child custody law was built on a model of one custodial parent, i.e., sole custody. 
That parent was both decision-maker and provider of residential care for the child. 
The noncustodial parent had a very limited role, and the term used by most statutes 
to describe the rights and status of the noncustodial parent—visitation—was indica-
tive of that limited role.  
Marygold S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce Ar-
rangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 776; see also Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 
65 (N.J. 1981) (observing that “[s]ole custody tends . . . to isolate children from the noncus-
todial parent” and engenders bitterness “because of the absolute nature of sole custody deter-
minations, in which one parent ‘wins’ and the other ‘loses’”); Scott, supra note 8, at 624 
(“The typical sole custody arrangement under the best interests standard relegates fathers to 
the status of ‘visitors,’ sharply diminishing their parent-child contact and withdrawing their 
parental authority.”). Certainly, many noncustodial fathers have complained bitterly that they 
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sumption and, instead, encourage a highly interactive arrangement in 
which respective parenting roles can be creatively and flexibly tai-
lored to fit individual families.96 Accordingly, an allocation of “cus-
todial responsibility” under the ALI Principles to a de facto parent or 
parent by estoppel will typically entail a less drastic incursion upon 
the child rearing role of the legal parent. Under the ALI Principles, 
the legal parent is not reduced to a noncustodial parent with occa-
sional visitation; rather, the parent will be given her own share of 
“custodial responsibility,” which will presumptively include the right 
to participate in major life decisions for the child97 and “sole respon-
sibility for day-to-day decisions for the child while the child is in that 
parent’s care and control.”98 Section 2.09, in addition, directs that 
courts grant legal parents, at a bare minimum, a sufficient amount of 
custodial time to foster a meaningful relationship with the child,99 
and section 2.21 goes still farther by requiring in almost all cases that 
the role of de facto parents be capped at something less than that as-
signed legal parents.100 
Moreover, in crafting the precise allocation of parenting roles, 
the Principles direct that the leading determinant should be the past 
practices of the parties themselves, providing reassurance that any 
court-ordered allocation will rarely involve a substantial diminution 
of a parent’s established interaction with a child.101 In this way, the 
 
felt sidelined by the visiting role assigned them by traditional custody law. See, e.g., Scott & 
Scott, supra note 84, at 2447 & n.136 (citing studies supporting the conclusion that “[m]any 
fathers tend to find this non-custodial relationship artificial and unsatisfactory”). 
 96. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 7, § 2.06 cmt. a (“The par-
enting plan concept . . . presupposes, and affirms, a diversity of child-rearing arrangements, 
rather than subscribing to a pre-established set of statutory choices about what arrangements 
are best for children. . . . The parenting plan requirement encourages parents to customize 
their arrangements to take account of the family’s own actual circumstances; if they cannot 
agree, other rules retain the focus on the family’s actual experience, by focusing on the past 
caretaking practices of the parents.”). 
 97. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 2.10(1). 
 98. See id. § 2.10(3). 
 99. See id. § 2.09(1)(a). 
 100. See id. § 2.21(1)(a) (proposing that the court ordinarily “should not allocate the 
majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a legal parent or a 
parent by estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority of custodial responsibility”). 
 101. See id. § 2.09(1) (stating that “the court should be required to allocate custodial 
responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent ap-
proximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the 
child prior to the parents’ separation”); id. § 2.10(1)(b) (stating that, in allocating significant 
decision making responsibility for a child, the court should consider “the level of each parent’s 
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Principles are crafted to minimize the courts’ impact upon the most 
valuable aspect of the parent-child relationship, “the emotional at-
tachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.”102 
C. Historical Veneration 
A final factor affecting the aggressiveness of judicial review has 
been the extent to which the family relationships burdened or ad-
vanced by the state’s intervention have enjoyed societal respect and 
approval.103 Tradition affects not only the Court’s definition of the 
“family” entitled to constitutional protection at the outset, but, even 
after that hurdle is cleared, the extent of the protection afforded.104 
This factor is perhaps something of a mixed bag for the ALI Princi-
ples. On one hand, chapter 2 is careful to honor traditional concep-
tions of family by recognizing and giving special importance to the 
relationship between a child and her legal parents (at least as com-
pared to de facto parents), but it then requires legal parents to share 
their privileged status with a new category of “parents by estoppel,” 
traditionally regarded as nonparents.105 The ALI’s provision for a 
new category of parents, with legal entitlements equal to those of 
 
participation in past decision making on behalf of the child”). 
 102. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (“[T]he importance of the familial 
relationship, to the individuals involved and to society, stems from the emotional attachments 
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a 
way of life’ through the instruction of children,” not simply “from the fact of blood relation-
ship.”) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 
(1977)); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98–99 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see 
also PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 7, § 2.03 cmt. f (“Because caretak-
ing functions involve tasks relating directly to a child’s care and upbringing, they are likely to 
have a special bearing on the strength and quality of the adult’s relationship with the child. For 
this reason, the Chapter makes each parent’s share of past caretaking functions central to the 
allocation of custodial responsibility at divorce.”). 
 103. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 589–91. 
 104. As noted earlier, for instance, the Court has appeared more skeptical of government 
regulatory measures that seem novel. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24; see also 
Meyer, supra note 34, at 589–90. 
 105. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 3, § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) (mak-
ing status as a “parent by estoppel” dependent upon the prior consent or agreement of the 
child’s legal parents); id. § 2.10(4) (entitling only legal parents and parents by estoppel to pre-
sumptive access to a child’s school and health care records); id. § 2.21(1)(a) (entitling legal 
parents and parents by estoppel to a presumption of a “majority” of custodial responsibility); 
id. § 2.21(2)(a)(i) (making the ability of a grandparent to seek visitation dependent upon the 
consent of a legal parent or parent by estoppel); see also  id. § 2.03 cmt. b (noting that “[a] 
parent by estoppel is afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent under this Chapter”). 
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biological and adoptive parents, undoubtedly represents a substantial 
departure from traditional expectations. Yet the significance of the 
innovation is limited by the fact that it is impossible to attain the 
status of “parent by estoppel” without the effective consent of the 
child’s legal parents.106 That the legal parent voluntarily created the 
family arrangement in the first instance lessens not only the substan-
tiality of the state’s intrusion on autonomy in directing that the ar-
rangement be sustained, but also the novelty of the state’s undertak-
ing. 
In sum, notwithstanding some very real innovations, the ALI 
Principles do contain significant limitations on the ability of courts to 
engage in “social engineering” of family life.107 Although the Princi-
ples do recognize new “parents,” they also limit that status to people 
who have an unusually deep involvement with a child that is fostered 
in some way by the legal parent. The Principles also limit the intru-
sive quality of custody orders by reconceiving what a grant of custo-
dial responsibility entails, and by seeking to carry forward each par-
ent’s pre-established childrearing role. Past Supreme Court cases 
suggest that these limitations should temper the rigor of any consti-
tutional scrutiny. By keying the Principles’ sense of “family” and 
their allocation of custodial roles in most cases to the parties’ own 
past practices and evident preferences,108 the ALI has substantially 
bolstered the Principles’ claim to constitutionality. Typically, child 
custody standards have sought to enforce particular conceptions of 
good child rearing.109 The maternal preference of the tender-years 
doctrine, for example, reinforced a normative vision of appropriate 
 
 106. See id. § 2.03(1)(b); see also supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 107. Indeed, as Barbara Woodhouse has pointed out, in some instances these limitations 
may be unduly rigid and may well prevent courts from protecting very substantial relationships 
between children and nonparent caregivers. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks 
at the ALI Principles (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Julie Shapiro, De 
Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 769, 776 (1999) (concluding that “[t]he narrow definition [of ‘de facto parent’] leaves 
the ALI’s promise for nonlegal parents largely unfulfilled”). 
 108. See Bartlett, supra note 11, at 852 (noting that “[p]ast caretaking is . . . likely to 
reflect actual parenting preferences, which means less distortion in the divorce bargaining 
process”); Scott, supra note 8, at 617, 633–37 (“Although contemporary families do not fol-
low any single prescription regarding the allocation of parenting roles, the division of roles that 
a given couple adopts likely reflects internalized values and preferences . . . .”). 
 109. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN 
FAMILY LAW 180 (2000) (observing that “[c]ustody paradigms have always reflected the 
dominant ideology of the family”); Bartlett, supra note 6, at 472–77. 
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sex roles in parenting.110 Presumptions in favor of joint custody ex-
press a distinctive ideal of shared parenting,111 and the best interests 
standard permits individual judges to enforce their own particular 
values, whether based on an assessment of the moral character of 
parents, the quality of their parenting, or any of innumerable other 
subjective, contestable judgments.112 The ALI’s custody standard, by 
contrast, does not seek to advance any particular vision of the ideal 
family or good parenting, but is driven instead by the goal of identi-
fying and sustaining the past child rearing choices of the particular 
family before the court. The ALI custody standard thus honors fam-
ily diversity, but not because the ALI favors non-traditional family 
arrangements; rather, it honors family diversity because it expresses 
 
 110. Under the tender-years doctrine, “[a]ll things being equal, the mother is presumed 
to be best fitted to guide and care for children of tender years.” Ex Parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 
686, 691 (Ala. 1981). The basis for this presumption, as explained by the Washington Su-
preme Court, was the belief that “[m]other love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of 
women, and as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring.” 
Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916). 
 111. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the 
Dependency Dilemma, BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 32–33 (1986) (advocating a preference 
for joint custody on the grounds that it expresses a “norm of parenting” under which “both 
parents should, and will, take important roles in the care and nurturing of their children”); 
Scott, supra note 8, at 616, 625 (noting that “[p]roponents rely heavily on the normative 
claim that a rule favoring joint custody is superior because it announces a societal commitment 
to promoting the sharing of parental responsibilities”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and 
the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1941 & n.105, 1969 n.190 (2000) 
(observing that laws favoring joint custody “expressed support for equal sharing of child care 
responsibility” and that “the predicted role change did not occur” partly because the norm of 
equal sharing is “inconsistent with the private preferences of parents regarding custodial ar-
rangements”). 
 112. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Dis-
putes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 488 (1983) (observing that the “best interests” 
standard lacks any “objective content” and can serve as a vehicle for the advancement of virtu-
ally any set of values); Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualiz-
ing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1356 (1994) (describing the “best in-
terests” standard as “an empty vessel usually filled by the preconceptions of judges and 
legislators about what they imagine would be good for ‘children’”); Robert J. Levy, Rights and 
Responsibilities for Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 197 (1993) (noting “the 
invitation the ‘best interests’ standard’s indeterminate qualities offers to judges to award cus-
tody to those litigants whose attributes and values most resemble their own”); Scott, supra 
note 8, at 622 (noting that “[t]he eventual [best interests] determination can be speculative 
and value-laden, as the standard encourages courts to assess the character of contestants and 
the potential capacity of each to assume the child’s future care”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Poten-
tial Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 871–73, 893–
94 (noting that judges have used the “best interests” standard to advance widely divergent val-
ues relating to sexual orientation and urging use of a statutory presumption to constrain judi-
cial policymaking). 
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so few normative judgments about alternative family arrangements. 
As Elizabeth Scott noted when she first advocated a similar ap-
proach: 
In an era in which no consensus defines family roles, the approxi-
mation framework responds to normative variation among families 
by recognizing and reinforcing the existing pattern of child care in 
each family. Through this approach, custody law subtly encourages 
desirable reform without seeking to coercively restructure complex 
family relationships.113 
That the ALI’s central goal is to reinforce past child rearing prac-
tices—“enabling” families to chart their own course rather than 
“standardizing” custody outcomes with reference to a fixed social 
norm114—should count for a great deal to a constitutional ideal that 
is said to be chiefly concerned with avoiding state-enforced stan-
dardization of family life.115 
III. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE 
The analysis so far has not discussed what may be the most hope-
ful sign that the judiciary is starting to accept the ALI’s view of fam-
ily. The Supreme Court’s most recent pass at family issues, last year 
in Troxel v. Granville,116 was widely reported in the press as a victory 
for parents’ rights. In fact, however, the decision striking down an 
order of grandparent visitation contains the seeds of a constitutional 
 
 113. Scott, supra note 8, at 671; see also id. at 672 (noting that the approximation ap-
proach ultimately embodied in the ALI Principles “offers the best available response to the di-
lemma of custody in a society in which each family functions according to an individual for-
mula of values and preferences”); Bartlett, supra note 6, at 480 (observing that the ALI’s 
approach to custody “declin[es] to impose some average, idealized family form on all families 
and instead favor[s] solutions that roughly approximate the caretaking shares each parent as-
sumed before the divorce or before the custody issue arose”). 
 114. See Bartlett, supra note 11, at 818, 851–52 (describing the Principles as “fam-
ily[]enabling” rather than “family standardizing”). 
 115. In summing up the constitutional defect in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, for 
example, Justice Powell observed: 
Pierce struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend the State’s public 
schools, holding that the Constitution “excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers 
only.” By the same token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardiz-
ing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined 
family patterns. 
431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). 
 116. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
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doctrine quite favorable to the ALI Principles. 
First, in assessing the constitutionality of Washington’s law 
permitting nonparents to seek court-ordered visitation,117 the Court 
again steered clear of the strict scrutiny standard.118 Instead of strik-
ing down Washington’s law for lack of tailoring to a compelling state 
interest, as the state supreme court had done below,119 the plurality 
in Troxel held only that the trial court was obligated to give greater 
deference to a parent’s own assessment of a child’s interests in 
weighing the benefits of visitation with a grandparent or other claim-
ant.120 Indeed, Troxel went even farther than past cases in disavow-
ing strict scrutiny in the context of family privacy. Whereas past cases 
had sometimes muddied the waters by using ambiguous synonyms 
for “compelling interest” scrutiny, the Court’s wholesale avoidance 
of that approach in Troxel and its substitution of a flexible, fact-
specific inquiry amounted to a tacit rejection of strict scrutiny. 
Second, the Justices in Troxel demonstrated a powerful wariness 
of bright lines or broad holdings in the field of family privacy. 
Whereas the Washington Supreme Court struck the state’s visitation 
law on its face, the United States Supreme Court addressed only the 
constitutionality of the trial court’s application of the law.121 Whereas 
the state court insisted broadly that the only sufficient basis for or-
dering visitation over the objections of a parent would be a finding 
that the child would otherwise suffer serious harm,122 a majority of 
the United States Supreme Court refused to address the conten-
tion.123 Justices Stevens and Kennedy, who did address the state 
court’s “harm” test for visitation, rejected it on the grounds that it 
 
 
 117. The Washington statute allowed “[a]ny person” to petition a court “at any time” 
for an award of visitation and directed courts to grant such a request if it deemed visitation to 
be in “the best interests” of the child. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2001). 
 118. Although six members of the Court wrote opinions in Troxel, only Justice Thomas 
expressly endorsed the application of strict scrutiny. See 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
 119. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28 (Wash. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 120. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67–69. The plurality refused to pass upon the state court’s view 
that the only public interest sufficient to justify court-ordered visitation would be protecting a 
child from serious physical or psychological harm. See id. at 73 (O’Connor, J., plurality opin-
ion); see also id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 121. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion). 
 122. See Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d at 28–30. 
 123. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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reflected an unduly “inflexible,”124 “rigid,”125 and “categorical”126 
view of parents’ constitutional rights. Instead of resolving the consti-
tutional questions with the announcement of a clear rule, a majority 
of the Court insisted that the better course would be to decide the 
issues slowly and incrementally against the background of specific 
family controversies.127 This consensus in favor of hesitation and re-
straint emerges as the most striking thing about Troxel.128 The Jus-
tices’ commitment to crafting the narrowest possible holding, replac-
ing the state court’s sweeping facial judgment with a decision 
arduously crafted to extend no further than the specific facts of the 
Granville-Troxel feud, suggests a more pragmatic approach to the 
problem of family privacy than is found in many state court deci-
sions.129 
The greater flexibility and self-restraint apparent across the great 
run of the Supreme Court’s family privacy cases should be reassuring 
to supporters of the ALI Principles. But the evident reasons for the 
Justices’ hesitancy in Troxel provide even more encouragement be-
cause they signal a dawning appreciation of the complexity and di-
versity of modern family life and the danger that bright constitu-
tional lines might lead courts to trample on the integrity and 
autonomy of real families in the service of an historical ideal. Justice 
O’Connor, for example, began the plurality’s analysis by observing 
that “[t]he demographic changes of the past century make it difficult 
 
 124. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 127. See id. at 73 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e agree with Justice Kennedy that the consti-
tutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that 
standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best ‘elaborated with 
care.’”); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The protection the Constitution requires . . . 
must be elaborated with care, using the discipline and instruction of the case law system.”). 
 128. See Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 279, 279 (“Although the decision split the Court six ways, it revealed consider-
able consensus. Eight Justices recognized some constitutionally protected right of parents to 
control their children’s private associations, but seven did so haltingly, reflecting their readiness 
to qualify that right in the face of competing relational claims more compelling than these as-
serted by the grandparents in this case.”); Meyer, supra note 2, at 1141 (“[T]he uniting theme 
of five of the six opinions in the case—representing a total of eight Justices—was a determina-
tion to tread softly and to avoid any heavy-handed formulations of parents’ constitutional 
rights.”). 
 129. See generally Meyer, supra note 76 (contending that Troxel represents a model of 
legal pragmatism in constitutional law). 
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to speak of an average American family.”130 As more and more chil-
dren are raised in single-parent homes, she wrote, “persons outside 
the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist 
in the everyday tasks of child rearing.”131 Other Justices expressed 
the same realization. Justice Kennedy argued for a narrow constitu-
tional holding and explained that his “principal concern” regarding 
the state supreme court’s broad ruling in favor of legal parents was 
that it 
seem[ed] to proceed from the assumption that the parent or par-
ents who resist visitation have always been the child’s primary care-
givers and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legiti-
mate and established relationship with the child. That idea, in turn, 
appears influenced by the concept that the conventional nuclear 
family ought to establish the visitation standard for every domestic 
relations case. As we all know, this is simply not the structure or 
prevailing condition in many households. For many boys and girls a 
traditional family with two or even one permanent and caring par-
ent is simply not the reality of their childhood.132 
Justice Stevens agreed that a constitutional analysis narrowly fo-
cused on the child rearing interests of legal parents was inappropriate 
in the context of modern families: “The almost infinite variety of 
family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society,” he 
wrote, “strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a con-
stitutional rule that treats a biological parent’s liberty interest in the 
care and supervision of her child as an isolated right that may be ex-
ercised arbitrarily.”133 Although Justice Stevens went furthest in ad-
vocating a direct balancing of the competing constitutional interests 
of parents, children, and nonparent caregivers,134 other Justices, too, 
 
 130. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
 131. Id. at 64. 
 132. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 133. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 134. In Justice Stevens’s view: 
Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents and the State 
over who has final authority to determine what is in a child’s best interests. There is 
at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in every case to 
which the [visitation] statute applies—the child. . . . [I]t seems to me extremely 
likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in 
preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and 
so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation. 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86, 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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seemed clearly to contemplate that constitutional solicitude for pa-
rental authority must bend to take account of a child’s interest in 
preserving ties with other substantial caregivers.135 
Ultimately, regardless of variations in the particular formulations 
each Justice advanced, a majority’s apparent acceptance of the consti-
tutional relevance of the evolving nature of family relationships is it-
self significant.136 Crucially, these Justices seemed to share “the 
premise that people and their intimate associations are complex and 
particular, and imposing a rigid template upon them all risks severing 
bonds our society would do well to preserve.”137 That premise is ob-
viously one shared by the drafters of the ALI Principles. That several 
Justices should express that sentiment so readily in Troxel gives real 
hope that constitutional law may well be learning the insights of the 
ALI Principles already. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The boldness of chapter 2’s custody provisions lies chiefly in the 
provisions’ expansion of the concept of parenthood and the accom-
panying erosion of the privileged status traditionally reserved for bio-
logical and adoptive parents. This innovation seems daring because 
of the importance that conventional substantive due process analysis 
 
 135. Justice Kennedy, for one, insisted that “the constitutionality of the application of the 
best interests standard [in visitation disputes] depends on more specific factors. In short, a fit 
parent’s right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a 
de facto parent may be another.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100–01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice 
Scalia, though dissenting on the ground that parents have no special constitutional right to 
decide visitation matters, nevertheless agreed that giving protection to parents’ privacy interests 
ultimately requires balancing the interests of other intimates: 
Judicial vindication of “parental rights” . . . requires (as Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
rightly points out) not only a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also—
unless, as no one believes, the parental rights are to be absolute—judicially approved 
assessments of “harm to the child” and judicially defined gradations of other persons 
(grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be in-
valid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the 
parents. 
Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 136. For a more complete account of the strands of consensus in Troxel and their signifi-
cance, see Meyer, supra note 2, at 1152 (“[R]ecognizing substantial emotional relationships 
between children and non-parents as a counterweight to the authority of parents would consti-
tute an important step in reorienting family privacy toward a model that is more concerned 
with the function and substance of intimate relationships than with historical notions of family 
form or allocations of decisional power.”). 
 137. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90–91 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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places on categorization and traditional prerogative. Yet the ALI’s 
innovation is by no means confined to the choice of titles for signifi-
cant adult caretakers. At least as significant, though less sensational, 
is the ALI’s reconception of the range of roles that may be assigned 
to caretakers following a family breakup and its narrowing of judicial 
authority to impose on families arrangements that they have not ef-
fectively chosen for themselves, either by agreement or by past 
course of conduct. And, in important ways, it is these latter innova-
tions that help to vindicate the first. In the ALI’s view, custody is not 
a one-size-fits-all prize to be doled out to parents fitting a single, 
formalistic mold; instead, the role of parent can involve any of a 
broad range of caretaking and supporting endeavors, and the court’s 
task is to help craft an individualized role that will build construc-
tively upon that which the parent has established for herself in the 
past. 
As the various opinions in Troxel v. Granville make clear, some 
judges are coming to share the insights of the ALI’s approach. Al-
though the ALI’s innovations bristle against a constitutional doctrine 
that paints parents’ privacy rights in bright, clear lines, they fare well 
with a doctrine that pictures family relationships and roles in all of 
their very real shades of gray. Even before Troxel and the ALI Prin-
ciples, the Court had shown glimmers of this understanding. A fuller 
appreciation in the years to come, as Troxel seems to portend, would 
benefit not only supporters of the ALI Principles, but a great many 
families as well. 
 
